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This paper introduces lumpy micro-level investment into a sticky information general equilibrium
model. Lumpy investment arises because of inattentiveness in capital investment decisions instead of the
more popular assumption of non-convex adjustment costs. Sticky information is the only source of rigidity
in the model and it is pervasive to all markets and decisions. The model yields aggregate dynamics that
are substantially di￿erent from those of an otherwise identical model with frictionless investment, and
much closer to the empirical evidence. These results therefore strengthen the case for the relevance of
lumpy micro-level investment for the business cycle.
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Figure 1 plots output and investment over the U.S. business cycle. The ￿gure shows that aggregate invest-
ment is strongly procyclical, very persistent and much more volatile than output. Underlying such smooth
aggregate investment dynamics are nevertheless infrequent and large, or lumpy, capital adjustments at the
microeconomic level. Doms and Dunne (1998) show that about 50% of an average plant’s cumulative invest-
ment over 15 years is concentrated in a period of two or three (contiguous) years.
Figure 1: Output and investment over the U.S. business cycle
Note. The ￿gure displays detrended quarterly real GDP and real private domestic investment in the U.S. over the period
1950-2005. The trends have been computed using the band-pass Baxter-King ￿lter. Red line: output. Blue line: investment.
Grey bars denote NBER recessions.
The volatility of investment is a prime contributor to aggregate ￿uctuations. According to Barro (1997, table
9.1), private investment accounts for about 93% of the ￿uctuations in GDP, and thus ￿as a ￿rst approximation,
explaining recessions amounts to explaining the sharp contractions in the private investment components￿. 1
Notwithstanding the importance of investment in explaining the business cycle (as well as, obviously, in
determining economic long-term growth), capital accumulation has somewhat been ignored in canonical
versions of the New Keynesian model ( e.g. Gal￿, 2008). By now, however, standard DSGE models do feature
endogenous capital accumulation (e.g. Levin et al., 2005 and Smets and Wouters, 2007). Developing a sound
1 Barro’s ￿ndings come from analyzing the role of investment during ￿ve U.S. recessions (namely, those ending in 1961Q1,
1970Q4, 1975Q1, 1982Q4 and 1991Q4).
2microfounded model able to explain aggregate investment dynamics has nevertheless kept economists busy for
years. To reproduce smooth aggregate investment dynamics, these DSGE models introduce convex investment
adjustment costs. In doing so, however, the lumpy nature of plant-level investment is simply brushed away,
and so these models’ microfoundations for investment behavior seem rather weak. More recent theoretical
research (e.g. Caballero, 1999) has proposed an alternative source for the smooth aggregate investment
dynamics, suggesting that it may result from aggregation of asynchronous and lumpy micro-level capital
adjustments, which can be generated by ￿xed costs of capital adjustment.
An important debate running through the recent general equilibrium literature is whether micro-level lumpy
capital adjustments have important implications for aggregate investment and, more generally, for the busi-
ness cycle. The origin of the debate over the (ir)relevance of lumpy investment for aggregate dynamics
dates back to Thomas (2002). Previously, partial equilibrium state-dependent lumpy adjustment models
(Caballero et al., 1995, Doms and Dunne, 1998, Caballero and Engel, 1999, Cooper et al., 1999 and Doyle
and Whited, 2001) had stressed important ampli￿cation and propagatory e￿ects arising from infrequent
plant-level investment activities. Thomas (2002) reassessed the impact of lumpy micro-level investment in a
general equilibrium framework and concluded that ￿rm-level investment lumpiness plays no important role
for the aggregate dynamics of the model economy. In fact, her lumpy investment model generates business
cycle dynamics that are alike to those generated by an otherwise identical model characterized by friction-
less investment. According to Thomas (2002, pag. 508), the irrelevance result arises because ￿in general
equilibrium, households’ preference for relatively smooth consumption pro￿les o￿sets changes in aggregate
investment demand implied by the introduction of lumpy plant-level investment￿. Subsequently Gourio and
Kashyap (2007), among others, contrasted the Thomas result and found that lumpy investment matters for
aggregate dynamics. They re-calibrated Thomas’ (2002) model and found that the recalibrated model has
properties that di￿er from those of the standard RBC model. This result led them to conclude that the
irrelevance result does not come only from general equilibrium e￿ects, but also depends on how the model is
calibrated. Currently, there are studies supporting either the relevance or the irrelevance result. 2
Against this background, this paper evaluates the relevance of lumpy investment in a sticky information
DSGE framework. In a companion paper to this one, Verona (2011), we show that time-dependent lumpy
capital adjustment behavior arises naturally when ￿rms face costs of gathering, absorbing, and processing
information. We also ￿nd that such partial equilibrium model is successful in ￿tting quantitative facts on
plant-level investment rates. In this paper we embed that theoretical framework into the Mankiw and Reis
(2006, 2007) sticky information general equilibrium (SIGE) model. Speci￿cally, we augment the SIGE model
with a set of ￿rms that make capital investment decisions with inattentiveness. In the capital-augmented
version of the SIGE model, as in the original SIGE model, the only source of rigidity is inattentiveness,
2 Papers supporting the relevance result include Bayer (2006), Sveen and Weinke (2007), Iacoviello and Pavan (2007),
Bachmann et al. (2010) and Fiori (2010). Khan and Thomas (2003, 2008) and House (2008) in turn provide additional evidence
in favor of the irrelevance result. A similar irrelevance result has been obtained in Veracierto (2002), who analyzes the role of
plant-level irreversibilities in investment for aggregate ￿uctuations.
3which is a pervasive feature of all markets and decisions ￿ consumption, wages, prices and capital investment
decisions are all based, to some degree, on outdated information.
This paper provides two main contributions.
First, embedding into the SIGE model lumpy investment that is consistently microfounded on inattentiveness
in capital investment decisions, reconciles general equilibrium modelling with the recent developments in the
microeconomic theories of investment. This model allows us to provide further contributions to the debate
over the (ir)relevance of lumpy investment for the business cycle.
Second, enhancing the SIGE model with capital and investment overcomes one of its weaknesses pointed out
in Reis (2009b). Such improvement narrows the gap between the sticky information DSGE approach and the
workhorse sticky prices DSGE framework ( e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003 and Christiano et al., 2005), which
has included capital and investment from the beginning. Moreover, we provide a fully ￿edged microfounded
DSGE model that relies only on one rigidity ￿ inattentiveness ￿ to mimic the inertia present in the data,
rather than on a large set of nominal and real rigidities as put forth by the sticky prices approach, e.g.
staggered price and wage setting with partial indexation, habit persistence in consumption, investment (or
capital) adjustment costs and variable capital utilization. In doing so, such a model also allows us to address
how far inattentiveness alone a￿ects macroeconomic dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the capital-augmented sticky information general
equilibrium (SIGEK) model, section 3 presents the key log-linearized equations, and section 4 analyzes the
business cycle implications of the model. Finally, section 5 concludes. Technical details are relegated to
appendix A.
2 The capital-augmented sticky information general equilibrium model
There are three sets of agents: ￿rms, households and government.
Within the ￿rms sector, there are two types of ￿rms, intermediate- and ￿nal-good ￿rms, and there is a contin-
uum of each indexed by i and f, respectively, in the unit interval. Monopolistic competitive intermediate-good
￿rms have two departments: an attentive hiring department that chooses how much of each variety of labor
to hire, and an inattentive pricing department that sets the price of the ￿rm’s output. Perfectly competitive
￿nal-good ￿rms also have two departments: an attentive purchasing department that chooses how much of
each variety of intermediate goods to buy, and an inattentive producing department that produces the ￿nal
good by combining its optimally chosen ￿rm-speci￿c capital with a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of varieties of
intermediate goods.
Each household is made up of a consumer and a worker, and there is a continuum of each type of individual
indexed by j and k, respectively, in the unit interval. Consumers consume, save and borrow by trading bonds
4between themselves. Each worker provides di￿erentiated labor services to intermediate-good ￿rms. Both
consumers and workers are inattentive and make optimal decisions only sporadically.
Finally, monetary and ￿scal policies follow exogenous rules and close the model.
Figure 2 sketches the structure of the model. Compared to the original SIGE model, the SIGEK model
features a new set of agents, the ￿nal-good ￿rms. 3 To lay down the model formally, we start by describing
the market clearing conditions and policy processes and then set out the agents’ problems.
Figure 2: Structure of the model
2.1 Market clearing conditions and economic policy
The total output produced by ￿nal-good ￿rms, Y FIN
t , is divided into consumption, investment and govern-
ment goods. Market clearing in the ￿nal goods market thus requires that:
Y FIN
t = Gt (Ct + INVt) , (1)
where 1 − 1/Gt is the fraction of output consumed by the government, and Ct =
´ 1
0 Ct,jdj and It =
´ 1
0 INVt,fdf represent, respectively, total consumers consumption and total ￿nal-good ￿rms investment.
Government consumption Gt is ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes to households that keep the budget balanced at
3 We separate ￿nal good production from intermediate goods production because of three main reasons. First, the separation
allows us to have an agent to be inattentive about the new decision, capital. Second, it is common in the literature to separate
the ￿nal good production from the intermediate goods, so as to have the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation occurring in production
rather than in consumption. As it is well known, it is irrelevant which way is chosen. Third, if the capital accumulation decision
is linked to the pricing decision of ￿rms, then a possible problem is that when one gets some estimates of the sticky information
parameter, it will be hard to understand what is driving them.
5all dates. The fraction Gt is stochastic and shocks to it can be interpreted as aggregate demand shocks. The
government also sets the nominal interest rate it according to:





− εt , (2)
where Pt denotes the price level, Πt+1 the real interest rate between t and t + 1, and εt a discretionary
monetary policy shock. The de￿nition of the nominal interest rate follows the Fisher relation, whereas policy
is set according to a Taylor rule that only reacts to in￿ation.
There is an intermediate goods market for each variety i, in which all ￿nal-good ￿rms f are buyers and the






t,f (i)df , (3)
where Y INT
t,i is the total production of intermediate good i at time t, and Y INT
t,f (i) is the demand by ￿nal-good
￿rm f of variety i at time t.
There is a labor market for each variety of labor k. The intermediate-good ￿rms i demand labor, which is




Nt,i (k)di , (4)
where Lt,k is the total labor supply of variety k at time t, and Nt,i (k) is the labor demand by intermediate-





t,f df and Lt =
´ 1
0 Lt,kdk.
Finally, nominal bonds are in zero net supply so the condition for the bond market to clear is
´ 1
0 Bt,jdj = 0.
2.2 Final-good ￿rms
2.2.1 Attentive purchasing departments
The purchasing department of the f−the ￿rm buys a continuum of varieties i of intermediate goods in
the amount Y INT
t,f (i) at price Pt,i, and combines them into a ￿nal input Yt,f according to a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator with a random and time-varying elasticity of substitution ˆ vt. Each department solves the following



















Optimal behavior implies that the demand for each variety i by ￿rm f is:
Y INT











1−ˆ vt is the static price index. Integrating over the continuum of departments f











2.2.2 Inattentive producing departments
The ￿nal good is the composite of two inputs ￿ a homogeneous input Yt, resulting from a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregator of varieties of intermediate goods, and the installed ￿rm-speci￿c capital, Kt−1,f . The producing
department of the f−th ￿rm produces the ￿nal good Y FIN






where α < 1 represents the share of capital in the ￿rm’s production function and Zt an aggregate shock to
the ￿nal goods production. The timing in (6) implies that capital becomes productive with a one-period
delay.
The ￿rm can purchase or sell capital instantaneously and frictionlessly, without any adjustment costs, at a
constant price normalized to one. When the price of capital is constant, the Jorgensonian user cost of capital
(i.e. the opportunity cost of holding one unit of capital for a period) is simply the sum of the discount rate
of the ￿rm and the depreciation rate.
Let us consider the problem faced by the producing department that last updated its information τ periods
ago. Following the SIGE tradition, we assume that, in each period, a fraction η of ￿rms, randomly drawn
from the population, updates their information, so there are η (1 − η)
τ ￿rms in this situation. Each of these
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= Et−τ (Πt+1 + ρ) .
If the ￿rm observed all variables, this condition would state that the ￿rm accumulates capital up to the point
where the marginal product of capital equals the user cost of capital. After some rearrangements, the desired
















To attain the stock Kt,τ in period t+1, the ￿rm demands the quantity INVt,τ of ￿nal good in period t given
by
INVt,τ = Kt,τ − (1 − ρ)Kt−1,τ . (8)
2.3 Intermediate-good ￿rms
2.3.1 Attentive hiring departments
Each of the intermediate-good ￿rms has a department that hires a continuum of labor varieties indexed by
k in the amount Nt,i (k) at price Wt,k. Labor services are combined into the labor input Nt,i according to a
Dixit-Stiglitz function with a random and time-varying elasticity of substitution ˆ γt. The hiring department
















The solution to this problem is:











1−ˆ γt is the static wage index. Summing over all ￿rms i and using the market










2.3.2 Inattentive pricing departments
Let us consider now the problem faced by the pricing department of an intermediate-good ￿rm that last
updated its information τ periods ago. Each period, a randomly drawn fraction of ￿rms λ updates their
information, so there are λ(1 − λ)
























Equation (10) is the production function, where β measures the degree of returns to scale and aggregate
productivity At is stochastic. The second constraint is the total demand for the ￿rm’s product in (5). The





β (ˆ vt − 1)Y INT
t,τ /Pt
 . (11)
If the ￿rm observed all the variables on the right-hand side, this condition would state that the nominal price
charged, Pt,τ, is equal to a markup, ˆ vt/(ˆ vt − 1), over nominal marginal costs, which corresponds to the cost
of an extra unit of labor, Wt, divided by its marginal product, βY INT
t,τ /Nt,τ.
2.4 Households
Households live forever and discount future utility by a factor ξ ∈ (0,1). They obtain utility each period
from consumption and leisure according to:






9where Ct,j is consumption by consumers j at date t, Lt,k is the labor supplied by worker k at date t, ψ is the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply and χ captures relative preferences for consumption versus leisure.
At each date t, the household faces a budget constraint given by:
At+1 = Πt+1






where At+1 denotes the real resources of households at the beginning of period t + 1 and Tt are lump-sum
transfers. These transfers comprise the pro￿ts received from intermediate-good ￿rms, lump-sum taxes paid
to the government, and payments for an insurance contract that households sign at the beginning of each
time period so that they begin each period with the same wealth.
In the savings market, consumers face a probability δ of revising their plans every period, so at each period
there are δ (1 − δ)
τ of consumers in this situation. They choose a plan for current and future consump-
tion, {Ct+τ,τ}
∞
τ=0, which is a sequence {Ct,0 ; Ct+1,1 ; Ct+2,2 ; ···} where Ct,τ is the time-t expenditure of a



















The ￿rst equation is the Euler equation for an attentive agent. It states that the marginal utility of consuming
today equals the expected discounted marginal utility of consuming tomorrow times the return on savings.
The second equation states that marginal utility of consumption for inattentive consumers equals the one
they would expect in case there was full information.
In the labor market, a randomly drawn fraction of workers ω updates their plans each period, so at each
period there are ω (1 − ω)
τ of workers in this situation. They choose a plan for current and future wages,
{Wt+τ,τ}
∞
τ=0, which is a sequence {Wt,0 ; Wt+1,1 ; Wt+2,2 ; ···} where Wt,τ is the time-t wage set by a worker
who last updated the information τ periods ago. The optimality conditions for workers are:
ˆ γt






























4 The dynamic problem solved by consumers and workers is more complicated than those solved by ￿rms. We refer the reader
to appendix A for details.
10The ￿rst equation is the intertemporal labor supply Euler equation for an attentive worker. If ˆ γt was constant,
the equation states that the marginal disutility of supplying labor today ( L
1/ψ
t,0 ) divided by the real wage
(Wt,0/Pt) is equal to the discounted marginal disutility tomorrow ( L
1/ψ
t+1,0) divided by the corresponding
real wage (Wt+1,0/Pt+1) times the real interest rate. With a time-varying ˆ γt, the Euler equation takes into
account the change in the markup charged by the monopolistic worker. The second condition notes that
workers who are not perfectly informed set wages so that their expected disutility from working mirrors the
disutility from working expected by the attentive workers.
3 The sticky information equilibrium
The detailed presentation of the model log-linearization is presented in appendix A. In this section we discuss
the key reduced-form relations. We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the non-stochastic steady
state. Small caps denote the log-deviations of the respective large-cap variable from this steady state, with
the exceptions of the following variables: vt and γt, which are the log-deviations of ˆ vt and ˆ γt, respectively; rt,
which is the log-deviation of the short real interest rate Et [Πt+1]; and Rt, which is the log-deviation of the
long real interest rate de￿ned as limT→∞ Et
¯ Πt,t+1+T

, where ¯ Πt+l,t+1+k =
Qt+k
z=t+l Πz+1 is the compound
return between two dates. Small letters with no subscript denote parameters and steady-state values.
















The level of capital stock (kt) is positively related to the expected value of the ￿rm’s production ( yFIN
t+1 ) and
negatively related to the current level of capital stock because of decreasing return to scale in production
(α < 1). A lower real interest rate (rt) implies a lower opportunity cost of holding capital and therefore an
incentive to increase the stock of capital. If many ￿rms are informed ( η is high), capital is instantly responsive
to changes in these determinants, whereas otherwise capital adjustment takes place gradually over time.
















β (wt − pt) + (1 − β)yt − at
β + v (1 − β)
−
β




The price level (pt) depends on past expectations of its current value, real marginal costs and the desired
markup. Marginal costs are larger the higher are the real wages paid to workers ( wt − pt), the more is
11produced (yt) because of decreasing returns to scale ( β < 1), and the lower is aggregate productivity ( at).
The desired markup falls with the elasticity of substitution across the varieties of goods ( vt). Unexpected
shocks to any of these variables only raise prices by λ because only this share of price-setting ￿rms is attentive
and, thus, aware of the news.






t − Rt) , (17)
where cn
t = limτ→∞ Etct+τ is a measure of consumers’ wealth and Rt =
P∞
τ=0 (it+τ − ∆pt+1+τ) is the long
real interest rate. Higher expected future wealth increases current spending, whereas higher expected interest
rates encourage savings and lower spending. The higher is δ, the larger is the share of informed consumers
who respond to shocks as they occur, therefore the more responsive consumption is to changes in these
variables.
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Wages (wt) increase one-to-one with the price level, as workers care about real income; they increase with
real wages in the economy, since higher real wages push up the demand for a particular labor variety through
substitution; they increase with labor supplied ( lt), because of the increasing marginal disutility of working;
they increase with wealth, since leisure is a normal good; they decrease with interest rates, since lower interest
rates decrease the return on savings and the incentive to work; and they fall as the elasticity of substitution
across labor varieties increases ( γt) since workers’ desired markup falls. As ω increases, a larger fraction of
workers is informed so wages become more responsive to changes in these determinants, whereas otherwise
wages only respond gradually over time.
The aggregate resource constraint is
yFIN
t = αcct + αiinvt + gt , (19)
where αc = c/(c + inv) and αi = inv/(c + inv).
The policy rules are
rt = it − Et (∆pt+1) (20)
and
it = φπ∆pt − εt . (21)
12Intermediate output is given by
yt =
yFIN
t − zt − αkt−1
1 − α
(22)





Equations (14)-(23) characterize the equilibrium for yFIN
t (￿nal output), ct (consumption), wt (wage), pt
(price), invt (investment), kt (stock of capital), rt (real interest rate), it (nominal interest rate), yt (intermedi-
ate output) and lt (labor) given exogenous shocks to εt (monetary policy), ∆at (aggregate intermediate-good
productivity growth), gt (aggregate demand), vt (intermediate-good markup), γt (labor markup) and zt (ag-
gregate ￿nal-good productivity). Each of these shocks follows an independent AR(1) process: εt = ρεεt−1+eε
t,
∆at = ρ∆a∆at−1 + e∆a
t , gt = ρggt−1 + e
g
t, vt = ρvvt−1 + ev
t, γt = ργγt−1 + e
γ
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4 Is lumpy investment relevant for the business cycle?
Having presented the SIGEK model’s key relations, we now study the impact of lumpy micro-level investment
on the aggregate business cycle. Through this section, we analyze and contrast the behavior of four models:
1. the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness;
2. the SIGEK model with frictionless investment, which is obtained setting η = 1;
3. a classical model, i.e. the SIGEK model when η = λ = ω = δ = 1 so that all agents are attentive;
4. the Mankiw and Reis SIGE model.
Recall that the Thomas’ (2002) irrelevance conclusion arises from the fact that her lumpy investment model
generates business cycle dynamics that are alike to those generated by an otherwise identical model charac-
terized by frictionless investment. Accordingly, comparing the results from model 1 with those from model
2 allows for gauging whether lumpy investment consistently microfounded on inattentiveness is relevant for
the business cycle. Model 3 is used here as the simplest benchmark, with which all models with some source
of informational inertia could be compared. Finally, comparing the results obtained with model 1 to those
obtained with model 4 allows for assessing whether the inclusion of capital and investment in the original
SIGE model modi￿es the performance of the sticky-information general equilibrium approach. 5
5 All simulations have been conducted with Dynare. The results for the SIGE model have been obtained by simulating the
Reis (2009a) model using the calibration in table 4. To make results comparable with those of other models, the simulation of
the SIGE model has been conducted setting αy = 0 in the monetary policy rule, that is, dropping the interest rate response to
the output gap, so that the nominal interest rate only responds to in￿ation.
13We calibrate the model assuming that a period is a quarter. The share of consumption in total output
αc is assumed to be 0.85, so that the share of investment is αi = 1 − αc = 0.15. The steady state real
depreciation rate and real interest rate, ρ and r, are set to 0.035 and 0.01, respectively, which implies a user
cost of capital of 18%/year. The share of capital in the ￿nal-good ￿rm’s production function α is set to 0.33.
The inattentiveness parameter η is assumed to be 0.1, which implies that ￿nal-good ￿rms are inattentive on
average for 10 quarters. 6 The serial correlation and the standard deviation of the ￿nal-good productivity
shock, ρz and σz, are set to 0.75 and 0.5, respectively. The values for the remaining parameters are taken
from table 2 in Reis (2009b). Those values have been obtained from the estimation of the SIGE model using
Bayesian methods on post-86 U.S. data. Table 4 shows the baseline parameter values for the SIGEK model.
In what follows we ￿rst analyze the impulse responses to the various structural shocks and then we investigate
the ability of the models to match some second order moments of U.S. aggregate data.
4.1 Impulse response functions
Figures 8 to 13 plot the impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation impulses to the six shocks.
In all ￿gures presented, variables are reported as percentage deviation from their steady state values, and
the horizontal axis represents time on a quarterly scale. Blue-circle and blue-diamond lines represent the
responses of the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness and with frictionless investment, respectively,
while red-cross lines represent the responses of the SIGE model. For the sake of clarity, we do not report the
impulse responses of the classical model, which are way too large and essentially have no persistence. We
￿rst describe the dynamics of the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness, and then we compare it with
the dynamics of the SIGEK model with frictionless investment and of the SIGE model.
Figure 8 plots the e￿ects of a positive (expansionary) monetary policy shock. The model with pervasive
inattentiveness predicts that output, consumption, investment, capital, hours worked, real wage and in￿ation
all increase in the short run in response to a monetary expansion. The responses however do not show
any hump-shaped pattern and, with few exceptions, they also converge rapidly to their steady state levels.
The fast reaction of macroeconomic variables to monetary policy is due to the fact that the policy shock is
short-lived (ρε = 0.29).
Figure 9 displays the responses to a positive intermediate-good productivity shock. By construction, the
impact of this technology shock on output, consumption, investment and the real wage can be permanent. A
positive productivity shock in fact permanently raises these variables but lowers hours worked and the output
gap on impact, consistently with the ￿ndings in Gal￿ (1999). Figure 10 displays the responses to a positive
￿nal-good productivity shock. Although the e￿ect of this shock is transitory, the dynamics is qualitatively
similar to that of the intermediate-good productivity shock.
6 The value for η lies within the empirically plausible range for the lumpiness parameter indicated by Sveen and Weinke
(2007). After analyzing the micro evidence reported by Doms and Dunne (1998), Sveen and Weinke suggest that the lumpiness
parameter should take values between 0.06 and 0.12.
14Turning to the aggregate demand (government spending) shock, ￿gure 11 shows that a positive innovation
to aggregate demand raises in￿ation, output, and hours worked. While increasing investment signi￿cantly,
this shock has a negative wealth e￿ect that induces consumption to fall.
Figure 12 displays the e￿ects of a positive shock to the price markup. The shock makes the economy
more competitive (the desired price markup decreases) and so in￿ation falls while output, consumption and
investment increase on impact. However, all variables respond quickly because the price markup shock is
also quite short-lived (ρν = 0.28). Figure 13 shows the e￿ects of a positive wage markup shock (which
corresponds to a fall in the desired markup). The real wage falls and there is an expansion in output, hours
worked, consumption and investment. The fall in wages induces a fall in prices, so in￿ation falls and the
central bank reduces the nominal interest rate over time to gradually push in￿ation back to its steady state
value. Noticeably, the responses of most variables are both hump-shaped and delayed.
Even though the shape of the impulse response functions of the SIGEK model with frictionless investment is
qualitatively similar to that of the model with pervasive inattentiveness, there are visible di￿erences between
them. As one would expect, the main quantitative di￿erence is that the responses of some variables, espe-
cially those of capital and investment, are much larger because attentive ￿nal-good ￿rms make their capital
investment decisions every period, so they react instantly to shocks. Interestingly, a positive intermediate-
good productivity shock in this economy raises hours worked instead of lowering them. The intuition is that,
with frictionless capital adjustment, ￿nal-good ￿rms invest much more because they expect to produce more.
However, in order to expand their production, they have to both accumulate more capital and purchase more
intermediate goods (recall that these goods are one input in the ￿nal-good production function). This pushes
up the production of intermediate goods (see equation 22), which more than compensates the increase in
productivity and leads intermediate-good ￿rms to hire more labor (see equation 23).
Figures 8-9 and 11-13 also report the impulse response functions implied by the SIGE model. Overall,
the dynamics does not change signi￿cantly when the SIGE model is augmented by a microfounded lumpy
investment model. The impulse responses of the SIGE model are in fact qualitatively, and in most cases also
quantitatively, similar to those of the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness.
Overall, and in contrast with Thomas’ ￿ndings, the impulse response analysis seems to indicate that lumpy
investment is relevant for the business cycle, since there are substantial quantitative di￿erences between the
models’ responses with lumpy and with frictionless investment.
4.2 Second moments: models versus U.S. aggregate data
We now examine whether the SIGEK model yields empirically reasonable aggregate dynamics by comparing
the model’s predictions with some key second order moments characterizing the post-86 U.S. economy. In
particular, we focus on the volatility and autocorrelations of output, investment, consumption, hours, real
15wage and in￿ation, as well as on the cross-correlation of output with the other variables. 7
Output and investment
Table 1 and ￿gure 3 display output and investment moments in the U.S. data as well as the corresponding
models’ predictions. The main features of the data are well-known. Both output and investment are very
persistent, with a ￿rst order serial correlation above 0.9. Investment is procyclical, with no phase shift, and
is about 5 times as volatile as output.
The classical model overestimates the volatility of output and investment and underestimates their persis-
tence. It also does not perform well when it comes to ￿tting the lead-lag relation with output. The SIGEK
model with frictionless investment (η = 1) does not perform much better than the classical model. In particu-
lar, the absence of sticky information in capital decisions makes investment too volatile (in both absolute and
relative terms) with no persistence whatsoever. Even though the contemporaneous correlation with output
is close to that observed in the data, all cross-correlations at lags other than zero are almost null. Pervasive
inattentiveness, in turn, improves the ability of the model to ￿t the facts on output and investment. Output
is less volatile and more persistent than in the classical model as well as in the frictionless investment model. 8
Although the model predicts that investment is only about two and a half times as volatile as output, it
improves promisingly as regards ￿tting investment autocorrelations (even at high lags) and the overall shape
of the cross-correlation curve.
By now, the results indicate that the SIGEK model is capable of delivering a plausible aggregate role for
lumpy investment ￿ the model’s implied second moments of output and investment are signi￿cantly di￿erent
from and closer to the data than those implied by an otherwise identical model with frictionless investment.
We now analyze whether the quantitative di￿erences in the models’ output and investment moments extend
to other key macroeconomic variables.
Consumption, hours, real wage and in￿ation
Table 2 reports the variabilities and autocorrelation coe￿cients of consumption, hours, real wage and in￿ation,
and ￿gure 4 plots the cross-correlations of these variables with output at di￿erent leads and lags. 9
The results still exhibit interesting di￿erences, both qualitatively and quantitatively, between the lumpy and
the frictionless investment model. In particular, the inclusion of lumpy investment adjustment does a￿ect
and, most importantly, improve the model’s performance along these dimensions. The crucial conclusion is
7 All data have been taken from the FRED database available through the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The cyclical
components of each series have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter and they are similar to those obtained
with the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter.
8 The SIGE model yields similar moments for output.
9 The SIGE model yields similar predictions.
16Table 1: Aggregate output and investment, models vs data in the post-86 U.S.
Standard coe￿cients of
Series deviation autocorrelation (order)
relative
absolute to output 1 2 3 4
data 0.90 1.00 0.93 0.76 0.52 0.29
output classical 3.16 1.00 0.60 0.51 0.48 0.46
SIGEK (η = 1) 4.34 1.00 0.35 0.30 0.29 0.29
SIGEK 2.67 1.00 0.90 0.83 0.79 0.75
data 4.33 4.84 0.93 0.75 0.51 0.27
investment classical 24.61 7.78 0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
SIGEK (η = 1) 23.39 5.39 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01
SIGEK 6.41 2.40 0.71 0.56 0.46 0.40
Note. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter to the logarithm of the original
series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters.
Figure 3: Cross-correlation of investment with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2}
Note. The ￿gure reports the cross-correlation of the cyclical component of investment with the K−quarter lag of the cyclical
component of output. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter to the logarithm
of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model: blue-circle line. SIGEK model
(η = 1): red-square line. Classical model: black-asterisk line.
17Table 2: Aggregate variables, models vs data in the post-86 U.S.
Standard coe￿cients of
Series deviation autocorrelation (order)
relative
absolute to output 1 2 3 4
data 0.79 0.88 0.95 0.81 0.61 0.41
consumption classical 3.09 0.98 0.56 0.45 0.41 0.38
SIGEK (η = 1) 1.96 0.45 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.79
SIGEK 2.00 0.75 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.80
data 1.39 1.55 0.96 0.86 0.70 0.52
hours classical 6.42 2.03 0.43 0.32 0.29 0.27
SIGEK (η = 1) 9.48 2.18 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.15
SIGEK 5.33 2.00 0.83 0.73 0.65 0.60
data 1.00 1.11 0.91 0.69 0.44 0.25
real wage classical 2.22 0.70 0.44 0.31 0.27 0.26
SIGEK (η = 1) 1.45 0.33 0.86 0.72 0.63 0.57
SIGEK 1.56 0.59 0.88 0.77 0.69 0.63
data 0.23 0.26 0.65 0.58 0.58 0.57
in￿ation classical 2.03 0.64 0.23 0.08 0.04 0.03
SIGEK (η = 1) 0.94 0.22 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.36
SIGEK 0.70 0.26 0.88 0.81 0.74 0.67
Note. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter to the logarithm of the original
series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters.
18Figure 4: Cross-correlation of other variables with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2}
Note. The ￿gure reports the cross-correlation of the cyclical component of the respective variable with the K−quarter lag of the
cyclical component of output. The moments for U.S. data have been obtained applying the Baxter-King bandpass ￿lter to the
logarithm of the original series, with a band of 6 to 32 quarters. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model: blue-circle line. SIGEK
model (η = 1): red-square line. Classical model: black-asterisk line.
that the model that overall best captures the moments of consumption, hours, real wage and in￿ation is the
SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness.
We can thus conclude that the business cycle is clearly a￿ected by lumpy investment at the micro-level. More-
over, pervasive sticky information improves the ability of the SIGEK model to overall mimic the dynamics of
key macroeconomic data (although some moments, especially the cross-correlations of consumption and real
wage with output, seem hard to mimic).
How sensitive are the second order moments of investment to changes in the degree of inat-
tentiveness η?
The previous results have been obtained by setting the degree of information stickiness η to 0.10 for ￿nal-
good ￿rms, in line with the suggestion of Sveen and Weinke (2007). To check for robustness, ￿gures 5-7
contrast the SIGEK model’s investment moments with their empirical counterparts, for di￿erent values of
the parameter η.
19Figure 5: Standard deviation of investment (sensitivity analysis for di￿erent values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model: black-circle line. Other parameters than η: see table 4.
Recall that the stickier information is, the smaller is the fraction of updating ￿rms (smaller η) and the smaller
is the impact of shocks on capital and investment. Thus, as the degree of information stickiness increases
(η decreases), investment should become less volatile and more persistent. Figures 5 and 6 con￿rm this
conjecture. The standard deviation decreases and the autocorrelation function shifts upward as η decreases.
The ￿gures further show that the SIGEK model has di￿culties in simultaneously mimicking the volatility and
the persistence of investment. On the one hand, the model is able to match the high volatility of investment
observed in the data only when ￿rms are often attentive, updating their information on average once every
eight months (η ' 0.4). One the other hand, a high degree of information stickiness ( η < 0.1) is required to
match the high persistence of investment.
While it remains true that the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness is superior to the alternatives here
studied in ￿tting the dynamic behavior of investment, it su￿ers from a trade-o￿ between ￿tting the volatility
and ￿tting the persistence of investment. It seems di￿cult to solve this trade-o￿ by only ￿ne-tuning one
parameter ￿ the degree of inattentiveness η ￿ in the economy.
Finally, ￿gure 7 plots the cross-correlation of investment with output at di￿erent leads and lags. As η
increases, the model becomes better at matching the contemporaneous correlation with output but performs
worse when it comes to matching cross-correlations at lags other than zero. Lower values of η (higher degrees
of inattentiveness in investment) seem to improve the ability of the model to ￿t the overall lead-lag relation
of investment with output.
20Figure 6: Autocorrelation of investment at lags 1 to 4 (sensitivity analysis for di￿erent values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.1): black-asterisk line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.2): blue-square line. SIGEK
model (η = 0.3): red-diamond line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.4): green-plus line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.5): cyan-circle line. Other
parameters than η: see table 4.
Figure 7: Cross-correlation of investment with output at lag K, K = {−2,−1,0,1,2} (sensitivity analysis
for di￿erent values of η)
Note. U.S. data: black line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.1): black-asterisk line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.2): blue-square line. SIGEK
model (η = 0.3): red-diamond line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.4): green-plus line. SIGEK model ( η = 0.5): cyan-circle line. Other
parameters than η: see table 4.
21Aggregate investment rate: partial versus general equilibrium models with lumpy investment
In table 3 we report two moments of the aggregate investment rate. Columns 2 and 3 are taken from Verona
(2011, table 2) and show the moments in the data (annual values) and the respective moments implied by
his partial equilibrium model with lumpy investment. Columns 4 and 5 report the moments in the data
(quarterly values) and the respective moments implied by the SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness.
Table 3 shows that there is an unambiguous improvement in the model ￿t moving from the partial equilibrium
lumpy investment model to its general equilibrium counterpart with pervasive inattentiveness. In fact, while
in a partial equilibrium framework the aggregate investment rate is less persistent and much more volatile
than in the data, its persistence increases sharply (although still remaining lower than in the data) and its
excessive volatility is virtually eliminated when lumpy investment is included in general equilibrium. 10
Table 3: Aggregate investment rate, models vs U.S. data
annual data partial equilibrium quarterly data SIGEK











) 0.846 0.172 0.970 0.724
standard deviation 0.011 0.102 0.137 0.07
a Data are annual private ￿xed nonresidential investment-to-capital ratio. b See Verona (2011, table 2). c Data are quarterly
private ￿xed investment-to-capital ratio. d Baseline parameters: see table 4.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the (ir)relevance of micro-level lumpy investment for the business cycle.
In Verona (2011) we showed that lumpy capital adjustment behavior arises naturally when ￿rms face costs of
gathering, absorbing, and processing information. In this paper we have embedded that theoretical framework
into the Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) SIGE model. Speci￿cally, we have augmented the SIGE model with
a set of ￿rms that make capital investment decisions with inattentiveness. In the SIGEK model, as in the
original SIGE model, inattentiveness is a pervasive feature of all markets and decisions, and it is the only
feature that leads to a deviation from a classical model.
We have found that the model with lumpy investment yields business cycle dynamics (both impulse response
functions and second moments) that are signi￿cantly di￿erent from those of its frictionless investment coun-
10 Khan and Thomas (2008) obtain a similar result using a state-dependent lumpy investment model. They ￿nd that their
general equilibrium model matches the data on aggregate investment rates much better than its partial equilibrium counterpart.
22terpart. In delivering this result the model has strengthened the case in favor of the relevance of lumpy
micro-level investment for the business cycle.
The SIGEK model has also allowed for addressing how far inattentiveness alone a￿ects macroeconomic
dynamics. We have found that the model with pervasive inattentiveness is better at matching business cycle
moments than is either a classical model or an otherwise identical SIGEK model with frictionless investment.
These ￿ndings are promising and con￿rm the Mankiw and Reis (2006) claim that pervasive inattentiveness
is necessary to explain business cycle dynamics in sticky information models. Introducing lumpy investment,
with a microeconomic foundation based on inattentiveness, in a sticky information general equilibrium model
seems to be a fruitful approach for further business cycle and monetary policy analysis. In particular, we
intend to estimate the model using both Bayesian and maximum likelihood methods so as to analyze a) how
well the SIGEK model ￿ts the business cycle and b) which are the optimal monetary policy rules in such
estimated model.
23Appendix A - Technical appendix
Inattentive consumers
Consumers, who revise their plans every period with a probability δ, have a value function V (At) conditional
on date t being a planning date. Consumers choose a plan for current ( τ = 0) and future (τ ≥ 1) consumption
all the way into in￿nity {Ct+τ,τ}
∞
τ=0 considering that with a vanishingly small probability they may never
update again:






ξτ (1 − δ)
τ lnCt+τ,τ + ξδ
∞ X
τ=0
ξτ (1 − δ)
τ Et [V (At+1+τ)]
)
subject to At+1+τ = Πt+1+τ





for τ = 0,1,2,...
The ￿rst term in the Bellman equation equals the expected discounted utility if the consumer never updates
her information again. The second term includes the sum of the continuation values over all of the possible
future dates at which the agent may plan again, each occurring with a probability δ (1 − δ)
τ. Since preferences
are additively separable in consumption and leisure, and since consumers do not control labor supply, then
the term in leisure drops out of the problem.
The optimality conditions are:



















is the compound return between t + τ and t + 1 + k.














Combining (A.1) for τ = 0 with (A.2) yields 1/Ct,0 = V
0
(At), that is, the marginal utility of an extra unit







































Workers, who revise their plans every period with a probability ω, have a value function ˆ V (At) conditional
on date t being a planning date. Workers choose a plan for current ( τ = 0) and future (τ ≥ 1) wage all the
way into in￿nity {Wt+τ,τ}
∞
τ=0, considering that with a vanishingly small probability they may never update
again:























subject to At+1+τ = Πt+1+τ











Nt+τ for τ = 0,1,2,...
The ￿rst term in the Bellman equation equals the expected discounted utility if the worker never updates
her information again. The second term includes the sum of the continuation values over all of the possible
future dates at which the agent may plan again, each occurring with a probability ω (1 − ω)
τ.
The optimality conditions are:
















(At+1+k) ¯ Πt+τ,t+1+k (ˆ γt+τ − 1)Lt+τ,τ/Pt+τ
i
(A.3)
for τ = 0,1,2,...














Combining (A.3) for τ = 0 with (A.4) gives
Wt,0 =
ˆ γt
























Combining these results implies
ˆ γt






























The log-linear sticky-information equilibrium
Log-linearizing the aggregate resource constraint (equation 1) and policy rules (equation 2) yields:
yFIN
t = αcct + αiinvt + gt , (A.5)
rt = it − Et (∆pt+1) (A.6)
and
it = φπ∆pt − εt . (A.7)
From the attentive agents’ problems (equations 5 and 9, respectively):
yINT
t,τ = yt − v (pt,τ − pt) (A.8)
lt,τ = lt − γ (wt,τ − wt) . (A.9)
26From the inattentive consumer’s problem (equation 12):
ct,τ = Et−τ [ct+1,0 − rt] . (A.10)


















From the inattentive pricing department’s problem (equations 10 and 11, respectively):
yINT













From the inattentive producing department’s problem (equations 6, 7 and 8, respectively):
yFIN



















Aggregating (A.12) gives the aggregate intermediate-good production function
yINT
t = at + βlt , (A.17)
and the market clearing condition implies that yINT
t = yt.
Aggregating (A.14) and (A.16) over τ gives the aggregate ￿nal-good production function and aggregate
investment:
yFIN





























This set of 19 equations (A.5 - A.23) provides the competitive equilibrium solution for the set of 19 variables
(yFIN
t , yFIN
t,τ , yt, yINT
t,τ , yINT
t , ct, ct,τ, lt, lt,τ, wt, wt,τ, pt, pt,τ, invt, invt,τ, kt, kt,τ, rt, it) as a function of
six exogenous shocks (∆at, gt, εt, zt, vt and γt).
The reduced-form sticky-information equilibrium




























Combining equations (A.8), (A.12) and (A.13) to replace for pt,τ, lt,τ and yINT








β (wt − pt) + (1 − β)yt − at
β + v (1 − β)
−
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t − zt − αkt−1

− at
β + v (1 − β)
−
β








Et−τ (rt+1) + Et−τ (ct+T+1,0) .
28Next, take the limit as T → ∞. As time elapses to in￿nity all agents become aware of past news so





= 0. Moreover, since the probability of remaining inattentive falls
exponentially with the length of the horizon, one can approach this limit fast enough to ensure that the sum






t . The ￿rst
equality holds because consumers are fully insured every period and in the limit all are informed. The second
equality holds because cn
t follows a random walk. Using the de￿nition of the long rate Rt, the expression
above becomes:
ct,τ = Et−τ (cn
t − Rt) .
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Equations (A.24)-(A.27), together with aggregate investment (A.19), the aggregate budget constraint (A.5),
the Fisher equation (A.6) and the Taylor rule (A.7) characterize the equilibrium for yFIN
t , ct, wt, pt, invt,
kt, rt and it given exogenous shocks to ∆at, εt, γt, vt, zt and gt.
The classical equilibrium
In the classical economy, λ = ω = δ = η = 1 so all agents are attentive. The model collapses into the
following system of 9 equations in 9 variables ( yFIN
t , yt , ct, invt, wt, pt, kt, rt and it ):
ct = Et [ct+1 − rt]


































t = zt + (1 − α)yt + αkt−1
rt = it − Et (∆pt+1)
it = φπ∆pt − εt .
De￿ning:





(r + ρ)(1 − α)































then ct is the solution of the following expectational di￿erence equation:
Ω4Et (ct+1) + Ω5ct + Ω6ct−1 = f (at−1,at,γt−1,γt,vt−1,vt,gt,zt,zt−1) .
Using the solution for consumption, one can show that the solutions for all the other real variables ( yFIN
t ,
yt , invt, wt − pt, kt and rt) are determined as a function only of the exogenous real shocks ( ∆at, γt, vt, zt
and gt), independently of the monetary policy shock εt. The classical dichotomy holds in this economy. The
monetary policy shock determines the nominal interest rate and in￿ation through the Taylor rule and the
Fisher equation.
30Table 4: Structural parameters
value sourcea description
Preference and production
β 0.67 RR return to scale (intermediate-good ￿rms)
ψ 5.15 RR Frisch elasticity of labor supply
v 10.09 RR elasticity of substitution across goods varieties
γ 9.09 RR elasticity of substitution across labor varieties
α 0.33 FV share of capital in ￿nal-good ￿rm’s production function
Nonpolicy shocks
ρ∆a 0.03 RR serial correlation of the intermediate-good productivity shock
σ∆a 0.66 RR standard deviation of the intermediate-good productivity shock
ρg 0.99 RR serial correlation of the aggregate demand shock
σg 0.83 RR standard deviation of the aggregate demand shock
ρv 0.28 RR serial correlation of the goods markup shock
σv 1.06 RR standard deviation of the goods markup shock
ργ 0.86 RR serial correlation of the labor markup shock
σγ 1.23 RR standard deviation of the labor markup shock
ρz 0.75 FV serial correlation of the ￿nal-good productivity shock
σz 0.5 FV standard deviation of the ￿nal-good productivity shock
3
2Table 4: Structural parameters (continue)
value sourcea description
Monetary Policy
ρε 0.29 RR serial correlation of the monetary policy shock
σε 0.44 RR standard deviation of the monetary policy shock
φπ 1.17 RR interest rate response to in￿ation
Inattentiveness
δ 0.08 RR fraction of consumers updating information every quarter
ω 0.74 RR fraction of workers updating information every quarter
λ 0.52 RR fraction of intermediate-good ￿rms updating information every quarter
η 0.1 FV fraction of ￿nal-good ￿rms updating information every quarter
Others
αc 0.85 FV steady-state share of consumption in GDP
αi 0.15 FV steady-state share of investment in GDP
ρ 0.035 FV steady-state real depreciation rate (quarterly)
r 0.01 FV steady-state real interest rate (quarterly)
Note. a RR: Reis (2009b, table 2). FV: our calibration.
3
3Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
frictionless investment (η = 1): blue-diamond line. SIGE model: red-cross line. Steady state: black dashed-dotted line. Baseline parameters: see table
4.
3
4Figure 9: Impulse response functions to an intermediate-good productivity shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
frictionless investment (η = 1): blue-diamond line. SIGE model: red-cross line. Steady state: black dashed-dotted line. Baseline parameters: see table
4.
3
5Figure 10: Impulse response functions to a ￿nal-good productivity shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
frictionless investment (η = 1): blue-diamond line. Steady state: black dashed-dotted line. Baseline parameters: see table 4.
3
6Figure 11: Impulse response functions to a demand shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
frictionless investment (η = 1): blue-diamond line. SIGE model: red-cross line. Steady state: black dashed-dotted line. Baseline parameters: see table
4.
3
7Figure 12: Impulse response functions to an intermediate-good markup shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
frictionless investment (η = 1): blue-diamond line. SIGE model: red-cross line. Steady state: black dashed-dotted line. Baseline parameters: see table
4.
3
8Figure 13: Impulse response functions to a wage markup shock
Note. Values expressed as percentage deviation from steady state. SIGEK model with pervasive inattentiveness: blue-circle line. SIGEK model with
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